

More Scottish than Welsh? Understanding the 2011 Devolved Elections

1. Introduction

It is a commonplace of contemporary political science, if a contested one, that the dominance of the state is increasingly challenged. Numerous external forces, from capital movements to trans-national security threats, climate change and (in some parts of the world) supra-national regional integration, apparently threaten states' supremacy in global politics. A rather less well-known, but now empirically well-established, challenge to the state comes, however, comes not from outside and above but from within and below. Many established democracies, and some other states, have in recent times experienced a significant regionalisation: a substantial growth in the scope of authority and level of powers wielded by sub-state regional government (Hooghe et al 2010). While much global political development over recent centuries can be understood in terms of the aggregation of power and resources by states, a key sub-text over recent decades is the diffusion of much of this to political institutions below the level of the state.

The clear implication that some draw from such regionalisation is that political science must question its prevailing 'methodological nationalism': the assumption that the world's states always constitute the appropriate units of political analysis (Jeffery and Wincott 2010). This is not to argue that states have become wholly unimportant; nor to deny that sub-state politics and government may be profoundly influenced by state-level developments. At a minimum, it simply means that sub-state politics and government must be taken more seriously. But progress here has been patchy, both by region – with some, such as Catalonia, widely analysed while others are relatively neglected – and by subject. A notable example of the

latter problem is electoral politics. Most states that have devolved powers to the regional level are democracies; regional governments are, thus, normally directly elected. Yet methodological nationalism remains largely unscathed in electoral studies. Statewide elections are still typically regarded as the defining political contests (attracting, *inter alia*, the major research funding); and sub-state elections are often understood to be driven by statewide political dynamics.¹

The consequences of methodological nationalism for the study of sub-state elections are many. General implications include that study of individual sub-state elections remains patchy and inconsistent; that the conduct of rigorous comparisons and the development of systematic theory about such elections continues to be limited; and that any potential contribution that study of these contests can make to understanding electoral behaviour as a whole remains largely unrealised. But methodological nationalism can also render the outcomes of some specific elections very puzzling. For instance, it is not readily apparent how statewide political dynamics could account for simultaneous regional elections, within the same state, producing sharply contrasting outcomes. But this is exactly what occurred in Scotland and Wales in May 2011. Despite a common UK political context, the result of the Scottish Parliament (SP) election – which saw a dramatic victory for the Scottish National Party (SNP), and the Labour party’s worst-ever performance – was starkly different to that of the National Assembly for Wales (NAW), in which Labour won with their best-ever performance, while the SNP’s sister party, Plaid Cymru, did worse than ever before in a devolved election.²

¹ We refer throughout to ‘statewide’ elections on the one hand, and ‘sub-state’ or ‘regional’ ones on the other. We avoid describing statewide contests as ‘national’ elections given the confusions that may arise, as in the cases of Scotland and Wales, where sub-state political entities have a strong national identity.

² Although Plaid Cymru and the SNP are wholly separate entities, they can legitimately be described as ‘sister parties’. Their respective representatives in the UK parliament at Westminster have long collaborated

This paper attempts to explain the differing outcomes to these two elections. We approach this task in the following manner. First, we set out the background to the May 2011 Scottish and Welsh elections, and detail the sharply contrasting election results in the two nations. The following section then draws on previous work on sub-state elections to develop two alternative hypotheses to explain the differences between voter choice in Scotland and Wales in 2011: that they arose out of the greater influence of UK-wide political dynamics in Wales than in Scotland, or that they reflected simply the differing relative attractiveness of the main parties in the two nations. We then introduce the Scottish and Welsh Election Study data used to conduct the empirical analysis, before reporting and discussing our main findings. Analysis of vote choice in the two nations shows substantial support for our second hypothesis. However, we also find significant evidence in favour of the former one: vote choice in the 2011 devolved elections was more distinctively Scottish than it was Welsh. Finally, the conclusion considers the implications of our findings: for our understanding of the 2011 Scottish and Welsh elections, and for the study of sub-state elections in general.

2. Background: the 2011 Elections in Scotland and Wales

Scottish and Welsh national distinctiveness have long received some recognition within the structures of the British state.³ In the late-1990s, the devolution policy of the Labour party

extensively; both parties have long been part of the Green/European Free Alliance grouping in the European Parliament; and both regularly send representatives to each other's party conferences.

³ The 1707 Union Treaty between Scotland and England which created Great Britain guaranteed the continuation of a number of distinct Scottish institutions, including a separate legal system and different established church. From the 1880s onwards, Scotland's treatment as a distinct entity by the UK government also involved the existence of a Scottish Office, headed by a Secretary of State for Scotland who was a full member of the UK Cabinet. Wales' full incorporation into the English kingdom in the 16th century lacked any similar guarantee of distinct status, and any official acknowledgement of Welsh nationhood was typically far more limited than in the case of Scotland. Nonetheless, a post of government minister with specific

UK government granted both nations significant levels of self-government within the UK.

The first elections for the SP and NAW were held in May 1999; they have subsequently been held regularly on a four-year fixed term. Thus, May 2011 saw the fourth set of elections.

Devolved elections in Scotland and Wales have seen substantial fluctuations in the levels of voting support and parliamentary representation won by the different parties. But they have also had some significant commonalities. In all cases, the final results, in terms of seats won, have been substantially more balanced than those seen in elections to the UK's Westminster parliament, where the single-member district plurality (SMDP) system has helped produce consistent Labour party dominance. The voting systems used for devolved elections incorporate a significant element of proportionality;⁴ predictably, those systems have generated rather less lop-sided results.⁵ But in addition to electoral system effects, devolved elections have also been distinct because they have seen different levels of party support from those pertaining in Westminster elections. In line with what appears to be the experience of many other stateless nations (Hough and Jeffery 2006), Scotland and Wales' main autonomist parties, the SNP and Plaid Cymru, have consistently attracted greater levels of voting support for devolved than Westminster elections.⁶

responsibility for Welsh affairs was established in the 1950s; this role was up-graded to a full Welsh Office with Cabinet-level representation in 1964. A valuable comparative discussion of this historical background to contemporary devolution debates is contained in Chapters 2 and 3 of Mitchell (2009).

⁴ Both devolved chambers are elected via a two-ballot mixed member system (see Farrell 2011 for a general discussion of such systems). The Scottish Parliament's membership comprises 73 MSPs elected on a plurality basis via single-member districts; and 56 regional list members, elected from eight regions. The NAW is elected via forty single-member constituencies, and twenty regional list AMs elected from five regions. In both Scotland and Wales, the number of constituencies won in a region is included in the allocation (via the d'Hondt' formula) of regional list members. The major, and obvious, difference between the two nations is the greater degree of proportionality inherent in the Scottish electoral system.

⁵ The result of the last UK general election prior to devolution, that in 1997, produced a Gallagher Index of Disproportionality score for Scotland of 27.7; that for Wales was 26.0. This compares with scores of 5.4 and 7.6 respectively for the first devolved elections in Scotland and Wales. (Authors' calculations).

⁶ Plaid Cymru's worst-ever performance on the constituency vote in elections to the NAW (the 19.3 percent achieved in 2011) is still well ahead of the party's best-ever vote share in Wales in a UK general election (14.3 percent in 2001). The SNP's worst-ever performance on the constituency vote in a SP election (the 23.7 percent they won in 2003) was nonetheless a higher vote share than that won by the party in Scotland in any UK general election, with the single exception of October 1974 (when the party achieved a 30.4 percent vote share).

The devolved elections prior to 2011, in May 2007, had seen the Labour party perform rather poorly in both Scotland and Wales. (See Table 1). Apparently handicapped by association with an unpopular Labour UK government in London, and facing a very strong campaign by the SNP, in Scotland Labour was narrowly overtaken in popular support by the nationalists, and emerged from the election with one fewer seat. This was the first time that the SNP had ever come first – either in seats or votes – in any parliamentary election in Scotland.

Although falling a long way short of a majority in the 129-seat SP, the SNP took power for the first time as a minority government – a status which the party maintained throughout the four-year parliamentary term. In Wales, while Labour remained the largest party by some distance in the NAW, it fell well short of a majority in the 60-seat chamber, having won its lowest vote share in Wales in any devolved or Westminster election since 1918. Plaid Cymru, the second-largest party in the NAW, joined with Labour in a ‘One Wales’ coalition which lasted intact to the end of the four year term.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

After the May 2010 UK general election, however, and the formation of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in London, opinion polls for the devolved elections due one year later showed significant shifts in voting intentions. Seemingly influenced by events at the UK-level – the formation of a government in London which had limited support outside England, and the fact that Labour in Scotland and Wales was no longer tarred by association with an unpopular UK government – the Labour party rose significantly in the polls in both Scotland and Wales, and began to establish a commanding lead in both nations in voting intentions for the devolved elections. As is shown in Table 2, by January 2011 the

polls were showing Labour in a consistent and significant lead in Scotland in voting intentions for both ballots. In Wales, Labour was in an even stronger position. But while the size of the polling leads differed, and Labour in Wales appeared to lack an opponent of similar strength to the SNP in Scotland, the broad trends seemed similar: influenced strongly by events at the UK level, the Labour party appeared on track for comfortable victories in the devolved elections in both nations.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Over the following three months (as panels C and D of Table 2 demonstrate) very little changed in Wales. Labour continued to consolidate its polling lead on both the constituency and regional-list votes. Although the party's vote share in the NAW election ultimately fell a little short of that suggested by the final opinion polls, Labour in Wales still achieved its best ever result in a NAW election: winning its highest vote share yet on both the constituency and regional ballots, and equalling the thirty AMs it had won in 2003. Events in Scotland could scarcely have been more different. From early in 2011, Labour's poll ratings began to ebb as the SNP attracted increasing support. As shown in panels A and B of Table 2, this tide continued until election day. In consequence, Labour's vote share fell (albeit only marginally) from that achieved in 2007 (hitherto its worst result in a SP election), and it lost several seats. And even more remarkably, the surge in SNP support took the party to the highest vote share achieved by any party yet at a devolved Scottish election, and to an absolute majority of MSPs. Yet for nationalists, as for Labour, the contrast between Scotland and Wales was stark. Plaid Cymru not only failed to achieve gains commensurate with those of its sister-party in Scotland; the Welsh nationalists actually experienced a net loss of four seats and their worst ever result in a devolved election. (See Table 3).

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

To summarise, three months prior to the 2011 devolved elections, Scotland and Wales had appeared to be heading for rather similar election outcomes, with the Labour party comfortably leading in both nations. In the event, the final results of the elections were very different. In Scotland, the nationalists had won an extraordinary victory and Labour had experienced its worst ever devolved election; in Wales, Labour had won its largest victory in a devolved election and the nationalists had done worse than ever before. The following section of the paper will explore existing understandings of sub-state elections, and consider how they may help explain why Scotland and Wales delivered such contrasting election results.

3. Theory and Hypotheses

There is a substantial tradition of understanding voting behaviour in many sub-state elections as being heavily shaped by political dynamics at the statewide level.⁷ Prominent elements in this literature include work on ‘electoral cycles’ in the U.S.A, where mid-term swings against the party of the president commonly encompass not merely elections to the federal Congress but also gubernatorial and state legislative polls (Campbell 1986; Atkeson and Partin 1995; Carsey and Wright 1998); a substantial body of work on *Länd* elections in federal Germany (Jeffery and Hough 2001); and also work on local government elections (Heath et al 1999). Outside the United States, the most prominent theoretical framework developing such

⁷ An interesting recent study by Bechtel (2012) reverses the normal focus of analytic attention, by exploring the impact on statewide electoral support of sub-state election campaigns.

understandings is that of Second-Order Election theory (SOE).⁸ This approach is grounded in the assumption that statewide general elections will be regarded by most voters as the defining, ‘first order’ contests. Other elections, it is suggested, will tend to be approached through the lens of politics in the first order arena, but to be seen by voters – and often by parties and the media – as of lesser importance. Certain rather predictable consequences are expected to follow from this lesser degree of importance. One consequence is that, with less at stake, fewer people will bother to vote in second-order contests. This has certainly been true of devolved elections in Scotland and Wales, and particularly the latter. At the May 2010 UK general election, turnout was 63.8 percent in Scotland and 64.9 percent in Wales; exactly one year later, turnout was 50.0 percent in the SP election and 42.2 percent in the NAW election.

Applications of SOE theory to European Parliament elections have demonstrated in considerable detail that, as was originally anticipated by Reif and Schmitt, the voting behaviour of those who do participate in second-order contests is often somewhat different from that in ‘first-order’ national elections. ‘Fringe’ parties that are usually marginalised in the latter type of contest can often win higher levels of support in the former. With less apparently at stake, voters seem more likely to use the opportunity to indulge a less strategic vote choice, or to issue a ‘protest vote’. But this work also indicates that there is a pervasive influence in second-order elections of statewide political dynamics. Notably, parties in government in the ‘first order’ political arena that are experiencing unpopularity are likely to do significantly worse in second order contests than parties who are more popular (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Hix and Marsh 2007; Hobolt et al 2009).

⁸ For the original SOE statement, see Reif and Schmitt (1980). Examples of the many applications of this approach to studying sub-state regional elections include Bromley (2006), Pallares and Keating (2006), and Tronconi and Roux (2009). Jeffery and Schakel (2013) note that Reif and Schmitt’s original statement, though developed in the context of analysing elections to the European Parliament, itself drew conceptually on Dinkel’s (1977) work on German regional (i.e. *Länd*) elections.

As indicated in the previous section, some of these findings appear directly relevant to the experience of devolved elections in Scotland and Wales. Labour's poor performance in 2007 seemed to have been at least partly due to the unpopularity of the Labour UK government in office at the time (Scully and Elias 2008; Johns et al 2010: chapter 6). And the influence of 'first-order' dynamics also appears evident for the period after the May 2010 UK election. The rapid rise in Labour party voting intentions for the devolved elections in the months after May 2010 – and also the substantial decline in support for the Liberal Democrats – seemed to follow directly from the installation in London of a UK government with limited support within both Scotland and Wales.

Nevertheless, significant limitations have also been demonstrated to the ability of SOE theories to explain devolved elections. SOE approaches offer little insight into the systematically different levels of electoral support that some parties seem to experience in different electoral arenas. Both in good years and bad, the SNP and Plaid Cymru win a greater level of support for devolved elections than they do for Westminster ones; a very similar pattern is observable for regional or autonomist parties in many other places. This does not seem to have very much to do with protest voting, or with people simply indulging a less strategic vote in a less important election for parties that are typically marginalised in first order, statewide contests. Many of those who vote differently at devolved elections from Westminster ones place relatively high levels of importance on the former (Wyn Jones and Scully 2006). Differential voting at the statewide and regional levels seems to be far more about 'arena' effects – which parties are seen as more relevant to which electoral arenas – than about the second-order impact of politics at the 'first-order' level. SOE theories also make little contribution towards helping us understand particular instances of regional

elections where parties perform poorly despite being popular at the statewide level, as happened to the Labour party in Wales in 1999 (Trystan et al 2003). And in the specific context of the 2011 Scottish and Welsh elections, while statewide factors appear pertinent to the polling trends of the latter part of 2010, they do not seem to offer much to explain the stark differences between Scotland and Wales that developed over the final three months leading up to the May elections. Given the simultaneity of the elections, and the common statewide context, the puzzle is to explain why these two elections produced such contrasting results.

Further insight into the limitations of SOE theories in understanding regional elections – insight of considerable potential relevance to the Scottish and Welsh cases – is provided by Jeffery and Schakel (2012). In a large-N statistical analysis, they find that the extent to which regional elections follow patterns distinct from those of statewide politics is a direct function of the extent of powers enjoyed by regional government; in some specifications their analysis also finds significant effects for the degree of historical distinctiveness of the region.⁹ Those regions with greater regional autonomy, and those with a stronger history of distinctiveness, are more likely in sub-state elections to vote for regionalist or autonomist parties and to diverge from prevailing patterns of electoral support across the rest of the state. These findings may help explain the contrasting electoral patterns of Scotland and Wales. While both have a long history of national distinctiveness, Scotland in many senses appears to be more ‘Scottish’ than Wales is ‘Welsh’. There have long been a greater number of distinctly Scottish legal and civic institutions than Welsh equivalents (see note 1); the native Scottish

⁹ Jeffery and Schakel also find that regional elections are unlikely to follow the predictions of SOE when: state-wide and regional elections are held simultaneously; there is a lack of any connection between the outcomes of regional elections and national government power (in contrast to the situation in political systems such as Germany, where the results of *Länd* elections directly impact upon the membership of the upper house of the federal parliament, the Bundesrat); and where regional elections are fought by significant non-statewide parties. However, the first of these three conditions is not something that has yet occurred in any SP or NAW election, while the latter two are common features to both Scotland and Wales.

news media is much stronger than its Welsh equivalent; the sense of Scottish national identity is more distinct from a British identity than is the Welsh (as demonstrated in Table 4, which presents data from 2011 on the ‘Moreno’ national identity profiles of both nations);¹⁰ and Scotland’s 1990s devolution settlement gave it a significantly greater degree of self-government than did the equivalent dispensation for Wales.¹¹ A first hypothesis to explore in our analysis, therefore, is simply that, in line with the general pattern identified by Jeffery and Schakel, the influence of UK-wide factors on voting behaviour in the 2011 devolved elections was substantially stronger in Wales than in Scotland: that a major reason for the sharply contrasting voting patterns in the two nations is that the election was more ‘Scottish’ in Scotland than it was ‘Welsh’ in Wales.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

However, simply suggesting that statewide factors will be of greater influence in some electoral contexts than others in itself tells us rather little about what drives voting behaviour in devolved elections. It does not tell us which statewide factors are important, nor the other variables that might shape voters’ choices. The analysis that has gone furthest in addressing these questions is Johns et al’s (2010) study of the 2007 Scottish election. Adapting a ‘valence politics’ perspective to a devolved Scottish election,¹² they suggest strong commonalities between how voters choose in statewide and sub-state elections. Voting at both levels is, it appears, primarily about competence and perceived effectiveness to deliver

¹⁰ The Moreno national identity question was first developed by Juan Linz and Luis Moreno in the context of research on Scotland and on Spain’s autonomous communities, primarily the Basques and Catalans. (For discussion of the background to the development of the question, see Moreno 2006).

¹¹ On the Regional Authority Index (RAI) created by Hooghe et al (2010), Scotland scored 16.5 (out of a possible 24) throughout the period 1999-2006; Wales scored 11.5. Although the March 2011 referendum, shortly prior to the May elections, supported a substantial increase in the legislative powers of the NAW, even with these additional powers Wales would almost certainly have remained some way below Scotland on the RAI in May 2011.

¹² For major contemporary applications of ideas about ‘valence politics’ to understanding elections, see Clarke et al (2004, 2009a, 2009b), Sanders et al (2011).

widely-shared objectives such as prosperity, security and efficient public services.¹³ The nature of valence issues may differ to some extent: a reputation for ‘defending Scottish interests’ appears particularly valued in the context of these devolved elections. And attitudes to statewide political actors and issues can be of some influence in shaping voting decisions, even in a devolved context where such actors and issues are not strictly relevant. But in the main, Johns and colleagues find that devolved voting behaviour is driven by similar kinds of things that drive voting in UK general elections, and other such contests elsewhere: the perceived competence and attractiveness of the main alternative choices.

The remainder of the analysis in this paper will adapt and extend this approach to a comparison of Scotland and Wales in 2011, doing so in a manner that will allow us to test two potential explanations of the starkly differing elections results the two nations experienced. The first hypothesis, as outlined above, is that the difference reflected, in the main, a greater degree of attention to statewide factors in Wales than in Scotland: this would imply that attitudes towards UK-wide actors and issues were more strongly related to vote choice in Wales than in Scotland. The second hypothesis follows directly from the valence politics perspective. This hypothesis is that the basis for vote choice in the two nations was very similar, and that the starkly different outcomes in Scotland and Wales simply reflected the relative attractiveness of the alternative political options in the two nations. This would imply that Labour in Wales was simply much more highly regarded by the voters than Labour in Scotland; and that something similar was true of the SNP in Scotland in comparison with Plaid Cymru in Wales. If such were the case, then the basis for electoral choice might have been very similar, even as the elections delivered strikingly different results.

¹³ It should be noted that voters’ abilities to attribute responsibility for policy outcomes to different levels of government may vary across political systems, and will often be highly imperfect (Johns 2011; Leon 2012)

4. Data and Methods

The analysis reported below draws on the 2011 Scottish Election Study (SES), and the 2011 Welsh Election Study (WES).¹⁴ Both election studies were conducted via the internet, in collaboration with the survey agency YouGov – thus obviating any potential ‘mode’ or ‘house’ effects in comparing results across the two nations. Both studies carried out pre- and post-election waves of sampling, with the post-election waves conducted immediately after the election.¹⁵ SES included 2046 respondents in its pre-election wave; of these, 1760 (just over 86 percent) also completed the post-election wave. For WES, a total of 2359 respondents participated in the pre-election wave; of these, 2217 (just under 94 percent) also participated in the post-election wave.

As indicated above, our empirical analysis seeks to test two hypotheses about the different patterns of vote choice in the 2011 Scottish and Welsh elections: that UK-wide factors were more influential over vote choice in Wales than in Scotland; and that differences between the election results in the two nations simply reflected the differential degree of attractiveness of the main parties. The survey data offers initial support for both hypotheses. In relation to the first hypothesis, a comparison of SES and WES evidence indicates that respondents in Scotland were more likely to claim that they had based their vote choice ‘mainly on what was

¹⁴ The 2011 Scottish Election Study was supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council (ES/I036818/1). The study was co-directed by Christopher Carman, Robert Johns and James Mitchell, with all fieldwork carried out by YouGov. The 2011 Welsh Election Study was supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council (RES-062-23-2625). The study was co-directed by Roger Scully and Richard Wyn Jones, with all fieldwork carried out by YouGov.

¹⁵ The pre-election wave of SES was conducted approximately one week before the election; the WES pre-election wave was conducted as a rolling sample through the final four weeks of campaigning.

going on in Scotland' than were those in Wales to indicate the equivalent about Wales.¹⁶ But there is also some indication that the relative attractiveness of Labour and the nationalist parties was rather different in the two nations. For instance, comparing ratings of the main party leaders (see Table 5) indicates that while the main three UK-wide leaders were held in similar regard in Scotland and Wales, the relative appeal of Labour's Scottish leader, Iain Grey, lagged well behind that of his Welsh counterpart, Carwyn Jones; in a similar manner, Plaid Cymru's Ieuan Wyn Jones could not match the popularity of the SNP's Alex Salmond.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

To investigate the factors shaping voting decisions more systematically, we develop parallel multivariate models of vote choice in Scotland and Wales.¹⁷ For both nations, we analyse vote choice for Labour and for the main nationalist party (in comparison to all other parties, with non-voters excluded) using multinomial logistic regression. (The Appendix gives further details about the coding of all dependent and independent variables).

Several types of explanatory variables are included in the analysis. First, we deploy some standard social background variables (measuring the age, sex, social class and educational attainment of respondents). Second, we specify several dummy variables measuring the 'Moreno' national identity of survey respondents. Third, we include the key variables from typical 'valence politics' models of voting choice: a measure of party attachment; ratings of

¹⁶ In Scotland, 66 percent of post-election SES respondents reported that 'In deciding how to vote in the Scottish Parliament election', they voted 'Mainly according to what is going on in Scotland'; 29 percent reported that they voted 'Mainly according to what is going on in Britain as a whole', and 5 percent of respondents chose 'Other reasons'. In Wales, 52 percent of post-election WES respondents reported that they voted 'Mainly according to what is going on in Wales'; 20 percent 'Mainly according to what is going on in Britain as a whole'; 27 percent chose a 'Both Equally' option (not offered to respondents in Scotland); and 2 percent 'Other reasons'.

¹⁷ We report here findings from analysis of the constituency vote; however, very similar findings obtain for analysis of the regional list vote in both Scotland and Wales.

the party leaders; and measures of the perceived competence and performance in government of the main parties. We also supplement these variables with a measure of the extent to which the different main parties were perceived to be concerned with the interests of Scottish/Welsh ‘people in general’.¹⁸

Our two alternative hypotheses point to somewhat different factors as potential drivers of vote choice. Our first hypothesis suggests that attitudes towards the main UK party leaders should be more strongly associated with voting decisions in Wales than in Scotland. It would also be consistent with this hypothesis if voting decisions in both nations, and particularly vote choice for the nationalist parties, were significantly related to national identity: with the more ‘Scottish’ identity profile of Scotland (in comparison to Welshness in Wales) thus leading to an expectation of stronger support for the SNP than for Plaid Cymru. Finally, this hypothesis suggests that attitudes towards the performance of parties in governing at the UK level should shape voting decisions more strongly in Wales than in Scotland.

Our second hypothesis, by some contrast, suggests that there should be little observable difference in the basis for vote choice in Scotland and Wales. If this were the case, then we would not expect attitudes towards either UK- or devolved-level political leaders to be systematically more important for vote choice in one nation than in the other. Rather, we should expect to see substantially the same variables being associated with electoral behaviour. Following Johns et al (2010), we might expect variables associated with ‘valence politics’ understandings of vote choice – such as party attachments, attitudes towards party leaders (whether at the UK or devolved levels), and perceptions of the governing

¹⁸ Johns et al (2010) find that perceptions of the extent to which parties are judged effective at ‘defending Scottish interests’ is an important predictor of voting behaviour in Scotland. However, no equivalent question was asked in Wales in 2011. Our measure of perceptions of parties’ concern with the interests of Scottish/Welsh ‘people in general’ is the closest variable we are able to specify for which we have comparable data in both nations.

performance and overall competence of the major parties – to be key drivers of vote choice. Also following the lead of Johns and colleagues, we might further anticipate that parties’ reputations as defenders of the respective interests of the Scottish and Welsh would also be highly important in the context of devolved elections. But the key point is that this hypothesis would suggest that the basis for vote choice should be substantially the same in Scotland and Wales.

5. Results and Discussion

We explore our hypotheses via a series of parallel multinomial logistic regression models, applied to the 2011 constituency vote in both Scotland and Wales. Outline findings for the goodness-of-fit of each model (comprising the adjusted R^2 ; the percentage of cases correctly predicted; and the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) statistic, a general indicator of model performance which penalises models with unnecessary variables, and thus encourages analysts not to run ‘kitchen sink’ models with every conceivable explanatory variable included (Burnham and Anderson 2002)) are presented in Table 6.¹⁹

TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

Our first models contain simply our social background variables, which have little ability to account for vote choice in either Scotland or Wales (although younger voters were significantly more likely to have supported the SNP.) The model fit improves in both nations when we also include national identity, although only modestly. In both Scotland and Wales

¹⁹ To minimise potential endogeneity problems, our ‘valence politics’ variables are all taken from the pre-election waves of sampling. Other explanatory variables were drawn from the post-election waves, except for Moreno national identity in Scotland, which was only measured in the pre-election wave.

there is a strongly significant association between a strongly or exclusively Scottish/Welsh identity and support for the nationalist parties. The greater strength of Scottish national identity than Welsh may thus help to account for the SNP's greater electoral success. However – and in line with other recent work in Wales which finds factors like class and national identity to be much weaker drivers of voting behaviour than has traditionally been suggested (Scully and Wyn Jones 2012) – we find that explaining electoral support for Plaid Cymru and the SNP requires us to consider much more than simply national identity.

Models 3 and 4 are more directly pertinent to testing the idea that voting in the SP election was more 'Scottish' in orientation than electoral choice in the NAW poll was 'Welsh'. A comparison of the findings for Model 4 shows that the relationships between voting patterns and attitudes towards the Scottish party leaders and towards the performance of the SNP Scottish Government were substantially greater than the comparable relationships in Wales.²⁰ By contrast, Model 4, which explores the relationships between vote choice and attitudes towards UK-level party leaders and government performance, obtains a rather better fit to the data in Wales. Taken together, the findings from Models 3 and 4 indicate that, very much in line with hypothesis 1, voting in the 2011 devolved elections was more strongly influenced by sub-state level political actors and issues in Scotland than in Wales; and, by contrast, that statewide actors and issues were of greater import to electoral behaviour in Wales.

However, to state this is to offer far from the whole story on vote choice in either Scotland or Wales. Model 5, a general 'valence politics' model that includes measures of general attitudes and attachments towards the parties, and also of attitudes towards leaders and

²⁰ The stronger association between vote choice and attitudes towards the party leaders and government performance in Scotland than Wales obtains despite the fact that the Welsh version of Model 4 includes one more variable than does the Scottish equivalent (reflecting the fact that WES asked about the performance of both Labour and Plaid Cymru ministers in the Welsh coalition government, whereas SES could only ask about the performance of the SNP in Scotland).

performance at both the UK and devolved levels, produces a much stronger model fit than any of those previously specified for both Scotland and Wales. This suggests, very much in accord with the findings of Johns et al (2010) regarding the 2007 Scottish election, that valence politics models of electoral behaviour can account effectively for vote choice in the context of devolved elections.

Detailed results for an aggregate model, which includes all the variables included in Models 1-5, are presented in Table 7. These findings show that, even after numerous other factors are controlled for, many of the associations identified in the previous models remain robust. Younger voters, for instance, remain significantly more likely to have voted for the SNP than older ones (although they were also more inclined to support Labour in Scotland than they were other parties). But the strongest predictors of vote choice in both Scotland and Wales are factors associated with standard ‘valence politics’ models of electoral behaviour: party attachments, attitudes towards the party leaders, and perceptions of issue competence, government performance and that parties were concerned with the interests of the people of Scotland or Wales. Overall, these findings offer strong support for a valence politics interpretation of devolved elections, and also for hypothesis 2: that the basis for vote choice in Scotland and Wales was largely common, and that the different degrees of success enjoyed by different parties in the two nations thus reflects their different degree of attractiveness as political alternatives.

TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

However, while the basis for vote choice was very similar in Scotland and Wales, it was not identical. And a key difference, that persists even in an aggregate model which controls for

numerous other potential influences on vote choice, concerns the explanatory leverage of variables relating to UK-level political actors. Attitudes towards the UK Labour leader Ed Miliband were substantially more strongly associated with vote choice – specifically choosing to vote Labour – in Wales than they were in Scotland. And while positive perceptions of the performance of parties in devolved government were significantly associated with electoral support for the SNP in Scotland and both Labour and Plaid Cymru in Wales, reactions to the contribution of the Liberal Democrats to the UK coalition government were again more strongly related to voting patterns in Wales than in Scotland.

A sense of the strength of these associations is given in Figure 1: this displays, for Labour and the nationalists in both Scotland and Wales, changes in the predicted probabilities of voting for that party of increasing a given independent variable from its minimum to its maximum value (while holding all other independent variables at their mean value).²¹ The figure shows the relevant probability changes for all independent variables that were significant (at the .05 level or better) from the aggregate model reported in Table 7. The figure reaffirms the strong relationship between vote choice and factors typically associated with valence politics theories (party competence and performance ratings, party attachments, and leader ratings). But it also reinforces the point that while the drivers of voting in Scotland appear to have been mainly general assessments of the parties and of their Scottish leaders, in Wales Labour party support in particular was significantly associated with attitudes towards the Labour UK leader and towards assessments of the UK government.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

²¹ The predicted probabilities reported in Figure 1 were computed using the Clarify programme available from Gary King's web-site (<http://gking.harvard.edu>). (See also Tomz et al (2003)).

In summary, our findings offer substantial support for our second hypothesis. Vote choices in the 2011 devolved elections in both Scotland and Wales can be substantially understood through the factors identified by valence politics theories of electoral behaviour. Voting choices were mainly shaped by the general attractiveness of the parties. But we have also found some significant support for hypothesis 1. Voting in May 2011 was a rather more distinctively Scottish affair in Scotland than it was Welsh in Wales.

6. Conclusion

There is an obvious innate interest to the 2011 Scottish Parliament election. It was probably the most dramatic election in modern UK history, witnessing a substantial turnaround in the fortunes of the two leading parties in the three months prior to the election, and producing a single-party majority under an electoral system specifically designed to make such a result highly unlikely. The election outcome is also interesting because of its likely consequences: the SNP victory making almost inevitable a referendum on Scotland's secession from the United Kingdom. But in addition, when paired with its simultaneous counterpart in Wales, the Scottish devolved election offers the possibility for a controlled comparative analysis of the factors shaping voting behaviour in sub-state elections. That is what this paper has sought to conduct – with the aim both of explaining the sharply contrasting elections outcomes experienced in Scotland and Wales, and also to offer more generalisable insights into how people vote in elections below the level of the state.

Our empirical analysis offers support for both the hypotheses that we developed. The findings reinforce the point that, to a substantial extent, vote choice in sub-state elections is shaped by

very similar factors as in statewide elections. The main elements of 'valence politics' models of voting behaviour are every bit as compelling in explaining vote choice in regional elections as in statewide ones. But the institutional and identity context within which sub-state elections occur is also important. The extent of autonomy enjoyed, and the degree to which any 'region' possesses a sense of national distinctiveness, also appears to be important for shaping how vote choice occurs. The greater extent of Scottish autonomy and distinctiveness helped to make their sub-state election in May 2011 significantly more 'Scottish' than the simultaneous contest in Wales was 'Welsh'. The growing empowerment of many sub-state regions has been a common feature of much of the democratic world in recent times. But we need to understand the differences between these regions if we are to comprehend adequately the elections for those governing institutions that increasing numbers of them have come to possess.

References

- Atkeson, Lonna Rae, and Randall W. Partin (1995) 'Economic and Referendum Voting: a Comparison of Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections', *American Political Science Review*. 89: 99-107.
- Bechtel, Michael M. (2012) 'Not always second order: Subnational elections, national-level vote intentions, and volatility spillovers in a multi-level electoral system', *Electoral Studies* (2012) 31: 170-183.
- Bromley, Catherine (2006) 'Devolution and electoral politics in Scotland', in D. Hough and C. Jeffery (eds.), *Devolution and Electoral Politics*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Burnham, Kenneth P. and David R. Anderson (2002) *Model Selection and Multimodel Inference: a Practical Information-theoretic Approach* (New York: Springer-Verlag).
- Campbell, James E. (1986) 'Presidential Coattails and Midterm Losses in State Legislative Elections', *American Political Science Review*. 80: 45-63.
- Carsey, Thomas M., and Gerald C. Wright (1998) 'State and National Factors in Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections', *American Journal of Political Science*. 42: 994-1002.
- Clarke, Harold D., David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whiteley (2004) *Political Choice in Britain*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Clarke, Harold D., David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whiteley (2009a) *Performance Politics and the British Voter*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Clarke, Harold D., Allan Kornberg and Thomas J. Scotto (2009b) *Making Political Choices: Canada and the United States*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).
- Dinkel, Reiner H. (1977) 'Der Zusammenhanf zwischen Bundes- und Ländtagswählerergebnissen', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. 18: 348-360.
- Eijk, Cees van der, and Mark N. Franklin (1996) *Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).
- Farrell, David M. (2011) *Electoral Systems: a Comparative Introduction (second edition)*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Heath, Anthony, Iain McLean, Bridget Taylor and John Curtice (1999) 'Between first and second-order: a comparison of voting behaviour in European and local elections in Britain', *European Journal of Political Research*. 35: 389-414.
- Hix, Simon, and Michael Marsh (2007) 'Punishment or protest? Understanding European Parliament elections', *Journal of Politics*. 69: 495-510.

- Hobolt, Sara B., Jae-Jae Spoon and James Tilley (2009), 'A Vote Against Europe? Explaining Defection at the 1999 and 2004 European Parliament Elections', *British Journal of Political Science*. 39: 93-115.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks and Arjan H. Schakel (2010), *The Rise of Regional Authority: a Comparative Study of 42 Democracies* (Abingdon: Routledge).
- Hough, Dan and Charlie Jeffery (eds.) (2006) *Devolution and Electoral Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Jeffery, Charlie, and Dan Hough (2001) 'The electoral cycle and multi-level voting in Germany', *German Politics*. 10: 73-98.
- Jeffery, Charlie and Daniel Wincott (2010) 'The Challenge of Territorial Politics: Beyond Methodological Nationalism', in Colin Hay (ed.) *New Directions in Political Science: Responding to the Challenges of an Interdependent World* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Jeffery, Charlie and Arjan Schakel (2012) 'Are Regional Elections Really Second-Order?', *Regional Studies*. (forthcoming).
- Johns, Robert (2011) 'Credit Where it's Due? Valence Politics, Attributions of Responsibility, and Multi-Level Politics', *Political Behaviour*. 33: 53-77
- Johns, Robert, David Denver, James Mitchell and Charles Pattie (2010) *Voting for a Scottish Government* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Leon, Sandra (2012) 'How do citizens attribute responsibility in multilevel states? Learning, biases and asymmetric federalism. Evidence from Spain', *Electoral Studies*. 31: 12-130.
- Mitchell, James (2009) *Devolution in the UK* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Moreno, Luiz (2006) 'Scotland, Catalonia, Europeanization and the 'Moreno' Question', *Scottish Affairs*, 54: 1-21.
- Pallares, Francesc and Michael Keating (2006) 'Multi-level electoral competition: sub-state elections and party systems in Spain', in D. Hough and C. Jeffery (eds.), *Devolution and Electoral Politics*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Reif, Karlheinz and Hermann Schmitt (1980) 'Nine second-order national elections: a conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results', *European Journal of Political Research*. 8: 3-44.
- Sanders, David, Harold D. Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whiteley (2011) 'Downs, Stokes and the Dynamics of Electoral Choice', *British Journal of Political Science*. 41: 287-314.
- Scully, Roger and Anwen Elias (2008) 'The 2007 Welsh Assembly Election', *Regional and Federal Studies*. 18: 103-109.

Scully, Roger and Richard Wyn Jones (2012) 'Still Three Wales? Social Location and Electoral Behaviour in Contemporary Wales', *Electoral Studies* (forthcoming).

Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg and Gary King (2003) *Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results*. Harvard University, Department of Government.

Tronconi, Filippo, and Christophe Roux (2009) 'The political systems of Italian regions between state-wide logics and increasing differentiation', *Modern Italy*. 14: 151-166.

Trystan, Dafydd, Roger Scully and Richard Wyn Jones (2003) 'Explaining the 'quiet earthquake': voting behaviour in the first election to the National Assembly for Wales', *Electoral Studies*. 22: 635-650.

Wyn Jones, Richard, and Roger Scully (2006) 'Devolution and Electoral Politics in Scotland and Wales', *Publius*. 36: 115-134.

Tables and Figures

Table 1: The 2007 Devolved Elections

A. Scotland

<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituency Vote</i>	<i>Regional Vote</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Labour	32.2%	29.2%	46
Conservative	16.6%	13.9%	17
Lib-Dems	16.2%	11.3%	16
SNP	32.9%	31.0%	47
Others	2.1%	14.6%	3
<i>Turnout = 51.8%</i>			

B. Wales

<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituency Vote</i>	<i>Regional Vote</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Labour	32.2%	29.6%	26
Conservative	22.4%	21.4%	12
Lib-Dems	14.8%	11.7%	6
Plaid Cymru	22.4%	21.0%	15
Others	8.2%	16.3%	1
<i>Turnout = 43.7%</i>			

Table 2: Average Opinion Poll Ratings, 2010-11*A. Scotland, Constituency Vote*

<i>Party</i>	<i>Pre UK 2010 election[#]</i>	<i>June-Dec 2010</i>	<i>Jan-Feb 2011</i>	<i>March 2011</i>	<i>April 2011</i>
Labour	33	41	42	41	35
Conservative	16	12	12	12	11
Lib-Dems	16	12	8	7	8
SNP	28	32	34	36	43
Others	7	3	4	4	3

B. Scotland, Regional Vote

<i>Party</i>	<i>Pre UK 2010 election[#]</i>	<i>June-Dec 2010</i>	<i>Jan-Feb 2011</i>	<i>March 2011</i>	<i>April 2011</i>
Labour	31	39	40	39	33
Conservative	17	12	12	12	11
Lib-Dems	14	11	8	7	7
SNP	26	30	31	33	38
Others	12	8	9	9	11

C. Wales, Constituency Vote

<i>Party</i>	<i>Pre UK 2010 election[#]</i>	<i>June-Dec 2010</i>	<i>Jan-Feb 2011</i>	<i>March 2011</i>	<i>April 2011</i>
Labour	32	42	45	48	47
Conservative	21	21	21	21	21
Lib-Dems	20	10	7	7	8
Plaid Cymru	22	21	21	18	18
Others	5	6	6	7	7

D. Wales, Regional Vote

<i>Party</i>	<i>Pre UK 2010 election[#]</i>	<i>June-Dec 2010</i>	<i>Jan-Feb 2011</i>	<i>March 2011</i>	<i>April 2011</i>
Labour	30	40	41	45	43
Conservative	21	20	20	20	20
Lib-Dems	18	14	8	7	8
Plaid Cymru	21	21	21	17	18
Others	9	9	10	11	13

(Sources: Scotland, <http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/scottish-voting-intention>; Wales, author's records)

[#] Parties' poll ratings before the May 2010 UK general election are taken from the most recent published poll to ask about devolved voting intention prior to that election. In the case of Scotland, this is a YouGov poll for Scotland on Sunday in late February; for Wales, the pre-UK general election measure derives from a YouGov poll for ITV-Wales conducted on 1-3 May, just a few days before the general election.

Table 3: The 2011 Devolved Elections**A. Scotland**

<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituency Vote</i>	<i>Regional Vote</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Labour	31.7%	26.3%	37
Conservative	13.9%	12.4%	15
Lib-Dems	7.9%	5.2%	5
SNP	45.4%	44.0%	69
Others	1.1%	12.1%	3
<i>Turnout = 50.0%</i>			

B. Wales

<i>Party</i>	<i>Constituency Vote</i>	<i>Regional Vote</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Labour	42.3%	36.9%	30
Conservative	25.0%	22.5%	14
Lib-Dems	10.6%	8.0%	5
Plaid Cymru	19.3%	17.9%	11
Others	2.8%	14.7%	0
<i>Turnout = 42.2%</i>			

Table 4: 'Moreno' National Identity, Scotland and Wales (%), 2011

<i>National Identity</i>	<i>Scotland</i>	<i>Wales</i>
Scottish/Welsh not British	27	17
More Scottish/Welsh than British	29	19
Equally Scottish/Welsh and British	26	30
More British than Scottish/Welsh	4	8
British not Scottish/Welsh	9	20
Other/Don't Know	6	6
Number of respondents	2046	2217

Sources: Scottish Election Study 2011, pre-election wave; Welsh Election Study 2011, post-election wave

Table 5: Mean (0-10) Ratings of Party Leaders, Scotland and Wales 2011**A. Scotland**

<i>Leader</i>	<i>Mean Rating</i>
David Cameron	3.1
Ed Miliband	4.1
Nick Clegg	2.8
Alex Salmond	5.5
Iain Grey	4.0
Annabel Goldie	4.2
Tavish Scott	3.7

B. Wales

<i>Leader</i>	<i>Mean Rating</i>
David Cameron	3.6
Ed Miliband	4.6
Nick Clegg	3.1
Carwyn Jones	5.8
Ieuan Wyn Jones	4.4
Nick Bourne	3.1
Kirsty Williams	4.4

Sources: Scottish Election Study 2011, pre-election wave; Welsh Election Study 2011, pre-election wave

Table 6: Goodness-of-Fit Measures for Models of Constituency Vote Choice, Scotland and Wales 2011*A. Scotland*

<i>Model</i>	<i>McFadden R²</i>	<i>% correctly predicted</i>	<i>AIC†</i>
1. Age, Sex, Social Class & Education	.02	47.7	3037.48
2. 1+ National ID	.09	55.1	2847.26
3. Scottish Leader Ratings & Scottish Govt Ratings	.46	77.2	1386.50
4. UK Leader Ratings & UK Govt Ratings	.22	60.2	2273.38
5. 'Valence Politics' i.e., Party Supporters, Party Best on Most Important Issue, Interests of Scottish People in General, Scottish & UK Leader Ratings, Scottish & UK Govt Ratings	.64	86.4	980.98
6. Aggregate Model	.66	87.6	989.06

B. Wales

<i>Model</i>	<i>McFadden R²</i>	<i>% correctly predicted</i>	<i>AIC†</i>
1. Age, Sex, Social Class & Education	.03	52.0	4257.14
2. 1+ National ID	.07	55.5	4096.81
3. Welsh Leader Ratings & Welsh Govt Ratings	.33	69.6	1892.68
4. UK Leader Ratings & UK Govt Ratings	.25	70.1	2677.52
5. 'Valence Politics' i.e., Party Supporters, Party Best on Most Important Issue, Interests of Welsh People in General, Welsh & UK Leader Ratings, Welsh & UK Govt Ratings	.50	80.0	1488.21
6. Aggregate Model	.52	80.4	1474.49

† Smaller AIC figures indicate superior model performance.

Table 7: Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates (Robust Standard Errors) for Aggregate Models of Constituency Vote Choice, Scotland and Wales 2011

A. Scotland

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>SNP</i>
Female	.56 (.34)	.22 (.27)
Age:		
18-24	2.05 (.71)**	1.89 (.68)**
25-34	1.81 (.66)**	2.26 (.64)***
35-44	.69 (.63)	.76 (.50)
45-54	.26 (.47)	.26 (.44)
55-64	.67 (.46)	.87 (.38)*
Middle Class	.12 (.31)	-.21 (.28)
<i>Highest Educational Qualification:</i>		
O Levels or equivalent	-.50 (.66)	-.27 (.67)
A Level / Highers	.34 (.59)	-.70 (.58)
University degree	-.07 (.56)	-.21 (.52)
Other qualification	.60 (.48)	.14 (.45)
<i>National Identity:</i>		
Scottish not British	.09 (.47)	.59 (.43)
More Scottish than British	-.08 (.44)	.43 (.34)
More British than Scottish	.27 (.59)	.49 (.58)
British not Scottish	-.29 (.54)	-.05 (.51)
<i>Party Attachments:</i>		
Labour	1.82 (.62)**	.93 (.71)
Conservative	-1.45 (.66)*	-1.23 (.49)*
LibDems	-1.65 (.73)*	-1.32 (.54)*
SNP	1.59 (.98)	1.37 (.55)*
<i>Leader Ratings:</i>		
Cameron	-.13 (.08)	-.02 (.07)
Miliband	.19 (.09)	-.13 (.08)
Clegg	-.08 (.09)	-.04 (.08)
Salmond	.00 (.07)	.34 (.06)***
Gray	.18 (.09)	.00 (.08)
Goldie	-.07 (.07)	-.14 (.06)*
Scott	.04 (.11)	-.00 (.08)
<i>Govt Performance Ratings:</i>		
Conservative UK	-.13 (.27)	-.11 (.23)
LibDem UK	.05 (.27)	-.06 (.22)
SNP Scotland	.01 (.22)	.55 (.19)**
<i>Party Best on Most Important Issue:</i>		
Labour	1.41 (.47)**	-.13 (.51)
Conservative	-1.13 (.73)	-.49 (.55)
LibDem	-1.78 (1.53)	-1.17 (.87)
SNP	.12 (.48)	.85 (.37)*
<i>Interests of Scottish People:</i>		
Labour	.89 (.24)***	.04 (.15)
Conservative	-.28 (.18)	-.19 (.15)
LibDems	.05 (.27)	-.12 (.16)
SNP	.01 (.22)	.31 (.16)
Constant	-1.47 (1.08)	-3.02 (1.04)**
Number of Respondents = 1193		

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001


B. Wales

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Labour</i>	<i>Plaid Cymru</i>
Female	.31 (.25)	-.44 (.29)
Age:		
18-24	-.42 (.60)	-.19 (.66)
25-34	-1.27 (.52)*	.11 (.59)
35-44	-.29 (.45)	.39 (.57)
45-54	-.38 (.44)	.40 (.48)
55-64	-.02 (.39)	.76 (.44)
Middle Class	-.02 (.24)	.14 (.29)
<i>Highest Educational Qualification:</i>		
O Levels or equivalent	.18 (.56)	.30 (.61)
A Level / Highers	.31 (.51)	-.63 (.70)
University degree	.90 (.47)	.69 (.58)
Other qualification	.26 (.46)	.57 (.59)
<i>National Identity:</i>		
Welsh not British	.21 (.37)	.87 (.42)*
More Welsh than British	.04 (.34)	-.15 (.40)
More British than Welsh	-.94 (.50)	-.44 (.56)
British not Welsh	-.73 (.37)*	-.53 (.43)
<i>Party Attachments:</i>		
Labour	1.17 (.33)***	-.47 (.48)
Conservative	-.54 (.46)	-1.15 (.53)*
LibDems	.25 (.88)	-2.07 (.95)*
Plaid Cymru	-.16 (.66)	1.54 (.54)**
<i>Leader Ratings:</i>		
Cameron	.02 (.08)	.07 (.10)
Miliband	.27 (.06)***	.08 (.08)
Clegg	-.07 (.08)	.00 (.09)
Jones	.16 (.06)*	-.02 (.08)
Wyn Jones	-.19 (.07)**	.10 (.10)
Bourne	.11 (.07)	-.12 (.07)
Williams	-.21 (.06)**	.05 (.08)
<i>Govt Performance Ratings:</i>		
Conservative UK	-.08 (.20)	.03 (.27)
LibDem UK	-.55 (.20)**	-.28 (.23)
Labour Wales	.72 (.26)**	-.00 (.23)
Plaid Cymru Wales	.31 (.23)	1.07 (.25)***
<i>Party Best on Most Important Issue:</i>		
Labour	-.33 (.31)	-1.27 (.45)**
Conservative	-.56 (.52)	-.99 (.54)
LibDems	-.78 (.96)	-.63 (.87)
Plaid Cymru	-.17 (.56)	.89 (.46)
<i>Interests of Welsh People:</i>		
Labour	.26 (.15)	.06 (.16)
Conservative	-.07 (.15)	-.22 (.18)
LibDems	-.05 (.14)	.00 (.17)
Plaid Cymru	.03 (.14)	.89 (.46)
Constant	-3.55 (.91)***	-5.00 (.94)***
Number of Respondents = 1355		


* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Figure 1: Changes in Predicted Probabilities of Supporting a Party on Constituency Vote


A. Labour, Scotland



B. SNP, Scotland



C. Labour, Wales



D. Plaid Cymru, Wales



Appendix: Variables Used in Empirical Analysis

Dependent Variables:

Vote: Reference category = voted for party other than Labour or SNP/Plaid Cymru

Independent Variables:

Sex: Reference category = male

Age: Reference category = 65 and older

Social Class: Reference category = working class or unclassified

Education: Reference category = no qualifications

National Identity: (Question: 'Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?'); reference category = Equally Scottish/Welsh and British, Other or Don't Know

Party Supporter: (Question: 'Some people think of themselves as usually being a supporter of one political party rather than another. Do you usually think of yourself as being a supporter of one particular party or not?'); reference category = non-supporter or supporter of another party

Leader ratings: Respondents' rating of leaders on 0-10 scale; (Question: 'Using a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly dislike and 10 means strongly like, how do you feel about...')

Government Performance ratings: Respondents' ratings on scale from 1 ('Very bad') through '5' (Very good) on ratings for performance of each party's ministers in the UK Government/ Scottish Government/ Welsh Assembly Government

Party Best for Most important Issue: Party named (1) or not (0) as party best able to handle 'the single most important issue facing Scotland/Wales at the present time'; reference category = no party or other party named

Scottish/Welsh Interests: Respondents' ratings on scale from 1 ('Not at all') through 5 ('A great deal') for each party; (Question: [Scotland] 'How closely do you think the different parties look after the interests of these groups? 'Scottish people in general'; [Wales] 'How much do you think each of these parties look after the interests of...' 'Welsh people in general')